War is the Drift of the State

By now, everyone realizes that the war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition. As BobBaer put it weeks ago, Russia is running shells through artillery pieces and moving a kilometre or less a day through brute destruction. Ukraine demands arms in enough volume to allow them to retake their territory.  The West gives them a fraction of that, enough to control the pace of defeat, and to drag that out. There’s tacit agreement between Putin and the West that this war will go on for years, that war will rule the global economy and climate policy, and that warmaking and war preparation will stay “the health of the state.”

 

Yesterday, the analyst of land warfare Jack Watling described the extent to which Ukraine has been trapped into attritional warfare. Towards the end he writes, “The final process of attrition for Ukraine is economic, and in this realm there can be no doubt that it is running out of money, while Russia can withstand western sanctions. Soon it will be essential for economic relief to sustain the government in Kyiv. Alongside the military considerations outlined above, therefore, ending the attritional struggle in Ukraine is ultimately a question of how much Nato members are prepared to invest in Russia’s defeat.”

 

The answer about NATO investment is “as little as possible.” “Fighting to the last Ukranian” remains the strategy. Reversion to the mean is the default answer, meaning back to the cold war, famine, and global poverty.

 The visits of EU leaders--and the invitations to Ukraine to apply for membership--make it impossible for Putin to back down. 

 

The UK's Boris Johnson didn't want to be left out. Same message.

 

The Westerners insure a Cold War standoff slated to go on for years.

The war comes as a forty-year free-money period comes unglued. Day after day, the Financial Times headlines deepening business alarm.  Will Hutton summarized the dying paradigm in the first paragraph of his Observer column, which appeared on the same day as Watling’s.

This is not the 1970s all over again, notwithstanding the apparent similarities – oil shocks, recession, seasons of discontent, inflation. What we are living through is something more profound. It is the painful unwinding of the dysfunctional Thatcherite economic model, driven by credit, consumption and property prices, so careless of investment, productivity and good, high-performance workplaces. Its end started with the financial crisis, accelerated with Brexit and is now sealed by the economic fallout from Ukraine.

He goes on to point out that this government has no economic plan, and also, that such a plan is beyond the capabilities of this government.

 

I said to Andrea yesterday in Crux Easton that the Tories have spent 12 years making the majority of their people poorer. 

“That’s always been the Tory strategy.” 

“Going back to the 19^th century?” 

“Before that.” 

“Since the Civil War in the 17^th?” 

“Yes, exactly since the Civil War. Since the Roundheads rose up, the poverty of the people has been the Tory strategy.”  

 

More people now say this about the Tories--that their goal is the poverty of the British people. The other consensus is that Labour has no alternative.  Party leader Starmer couldn't see Zelenskyy, so had a photo op with British NATO troops talking about Labour's restored patriotism. Kier and Boris are in full agreement.

 

The policy in the “West” is drift, and drift is the foundation of war.

 

Anything better will depend on mass mobilization, aiming at a positive alternative system.  Hutton again:

But just as Thatcherism emerged out of the 1970s, a new philosophy right for our times must emerge now. Its building blocks are still hazy but already apparent. The trillions of ESG (environmental, social and governance) savings need to be mobilised in partnership with government to pursue great national missions – levelling up, rebasing our energy system and grid to achieve net zero, opening up space, transforming our cities, building in new resiliencies, backing our science.

 

Yes. And this will only happen if policy agency shifts from the current leadership pretty much everywhere to regular people, who've set themselves up in organizations now largely invisible.   This is kind of great.

"This is a different brand of activist — young, mostly female and mostly from Eastern Europe — who believes that the Ukraine war is a brutal manifestation of the world’s dependence on fossil fuels. They have joined two causes — antiwar activism and climate change — to take full advantage of this moment when the world’s attention is focused on Ukraine. And to make their case, they confront Europe’s leaders face-to-face."   

They are great, and this needs to spread. It seems small, but only direct action is going to derail what's happening now.

The Era of Permanent Discontent

Thanks to Juan Cole for writing up the Top-10 "worst things about the wretched period" of the 2000s - for me the Top-10 signs of decline.  Yes, it was a truly bad start to the new millennium for which we have many dumbass electorates and self-serving elites to thank.  The decades' leaders replaced negotiation with belligerence wherever they found it convenient to them - really, with Iraq, whenever it felt right.  The same goes with finance now and the end - Cole's top 1% who reaped 2/3rds of the gains of the 2000s are getting a free pass from the Obama admin to do as they like.  The same goes with the environment, where the failure of Copenhagen to produce targets and timetables in an utterly quantified management culture that responds only to these will mean the reinflation of fossil fuel use - oil sands, clean coal, the whole 9 yards.

The decade began the Era of Permanent Discontent.  There were mass protests and opposition to policies like the Iraq war that political and business leaders systematically ignored.  Individuals like Dick Cheney were more openly contemptuous of public opinion than others, but it's hard to think of a national or state-level leader who has recently opposed his or her small inner circle or the Ring of Lobbyists - on any issue in order to back a majority view.

Continuing the cycle, obvious rejection of popular positions then produce further protests and widening gap between leaders and the vast majority they claim to lead.  Polling data picked it up: rulers implemented positions accepted by a minority of the public, and this is happening again with the health care "reform," where a "clear marjority" wants a public option (October 2009, December 2009), and where political leaders don't, and so there won't be one. In Europe they call this "post-democracy." In California, it is called minority rule, and a UC professor George Lakoff has started an initiative to end the Proposition 13-based supermajority rule for budgeting and taxes.  This is a great idea. But it needs to confront an electorate that has no experience with or trust in real majority rule.

The twin of permanent discontent is Permanent War.  Bush's "war that will go on for years" has become Obama's Afghanistan escalation and similar rhetoric of standing, dispersed dangers to global security.  Apparently no American executive can govern without Cold War-style insistence that the country is in grave danger from all over.  The benefits to the military and industry are obvious, and so are the benefits to executive authority.  Obama's Wars now involve escalating the drone attacks and secret military incursions into Pakistan that echo the Nixon-Kissinger incursions into Laos and Cambodia that hardened and widened the Vietnam war that they too claimed to be winding down.  In the context of majority demands for public health care, better infrastructure, cheaper higher education, green technology, more and better jobs, war has an important role to play.  The function of war i to make all popular things impossible.

It's worth nothing that finance has come to play a similar spoiling role. Its absorption of somewhere between $17 and 24 trillion has already killed off any new New Deal for the states and their outmoded intrastructures and social systems (the US ranks 12th to 16th in the social distribution of its own core technologies, broadband access).  Finance is increasingly acknowledged to invest largely in unproductive assets, so it's not like we need its domination over the economy because they are about to give back to society - give back new industries, high productivity growth, better living for all.

But the financial sector is good for the political executive function. It concentrates wealth and concentrates the power that goes with it.  Wall Street's importance magnifies Washington's importance, and the leaders of each get enormous personal benefit from the acute stratification of their sector, where all meaningful decisions are made at the top.  The concentration of finance into a few banks that are too big to fail is also good for the military, which operates on the same principle.  Having a superconcentrated financial sector run by insiders has long stabilized corrupt, crony-ridden governments in places like South Korea and Japan. It provides the same function in the United States.

The epoch battle now shaping up is between innovation and control.  Concentration and hierarchy are good for control and bad for innovation.  You can't spread broadband across income groups if you can't distribute and share because your broadband industry is a plutonomy of interlocking monopolists.  But most of our innovation industries, starting with IT, have become oligarchies built up around monopoly rents, and the innovation economist David Mowery has pointed out that software developed with market shares of 80 percent at home and 65% abroad (p 14).  Innovation depended on acquiring monopoly control in the post-war market environment - and on large amounts of military funding.

Where are the forces of innovation that can do without this kind of control?  Mostly lodged in our permanent discontent.  My hope - and fear - is that they will remain dormant until they enter into open revolt against the control-focused governance that now pervades every corner of politics and the economy.

In 1009, Egypt's Fatimid caliph al-Hakim leveled Jerusalem's Church of the Holy Sepulchre to the ground. He then "hacked the church's foundations down to bedrock."  The church was rebuilt in 1048, but it's initial destruction became the cornerstone of the crusade preaching of the Catholic Church. His successor would rebuild the church ing 1048, but Hakim's rash act stirs demands in Europe for a Christian crusade to recover the Holy Land from the "infidels." In 1096, the First Crusade would leave Europe for the Holy Land with more than 30,000 men, and would crystallize the anti-Islamic hostilities and salvific-warrior mentalities that seek to control our destiny today, a thousand years down the road.